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Abstract
Faced with a novel task some people enthusiastically embark in it and work with determination, while others soon lose inter-
est and progressively reduce their efforts. Although cognitive neuroscience has explored the behavioural and neural features 
of apathy, the why’s and how’s of positive engagement are only starting to be understood. Stemming from the observation 
that the left hemisphere is commonly associated to a proactive (‘do something’) disposition, we run a preliminary study 
exploring the possibility that individual variability in eagerness to engage in cognitive tasks could reflect a preferred left- or 
right-hemisphere functioning mode. We adapted a task based on response-independent reinforcement and used entropy to 
characterize the degree of involvement, diversification, and predictability of responses. Entropy was higher in women, who 
were overall more active, less dependent on instructions, and never reduced their engagement during the task. Conversely, 
men showed lower entropy, took longer pauses, and became significantly less active by the end of the allotted time, renew-
ing their efforts mainly in response to negative incentives. These findings are discussed in the light of neurobiological data 
on gender differences in behaviour.
Keywords Individual differences · Entropy · Apathy · Initiative · Response strategy · Intention to act
Introduction
It has been said that a problem ‘exists when a living organ-
ism has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be 
reached’ (Duncker 1945, p. 1). In daily life, this situation is 
extremely common. Every time, we deal with a novel task—
be it cooking a new dish, assembling the ultimate IKEA 
dresser or solving a puzzle—we are in fact presented with 
a goal and the need to find a way to achieve it. It is com-
mon experience that people vary considerably in the way 
they approach problems. A flourishing line of research has 
shown that multiple cognitive strategies can be applied to 
problem solving (e.g., Johnson-Laird 2010; Johnson-Laird 
et al. 2015): for example, problems like the popular Sudoku 
puzzles are better dealt with by deductive reasoning (Lee 
et al. 2008), while complex ‘series problems’ rather take 
advantage of tactical approaches (Lee and Johnson-Laird 
2013). Besides, people differ in their ways of thinking, so 
that some individuals appear to deviate from normative 
models of problem solving (cf. Stanovich and West 1998) 
adding to behavioural variability.
Differences also exist in availability or willingness to 
find solutions: Personality psychology describes ample vari-
ability in the tendency to “engage in and enjoy thinking” 
(need for cognition) (Cacioppo and Petty 1982) as well as 
in the perseverance and passion for long-term goals (grit) 
(Duckworth et al. 2007). Researches in the domain of social 
psychology further show that people vary in the degree of 
personal initiative they exhibit, i.e., in their attitude to be 
proactive, anticipating external events (rather than reacting 
to them) and persevering to achieve a goal, autonomously 
deciding what to do (Frese et al. 1997; Fay and Frese 2001). 
An interesting description of the variability in the way peo-
ple approach situations has been provided by self-regulation 
theories in terms of assessment vs. locomotion attitudes 
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(Kruglanski et al. 2000, 2012; Higgins 2003). Assessors 
would critically evaluate states in relation with alternatives, 
“measuring, interpreting, or evaluating something through 
comparing one thing to another” (Higgins et al. 2003, 
p. 297) to do just ‘the right thing’ (Kruglanski et al. 2000). 
Conversely, locomotors would rather commit resources to 
reach a goal in a straightforward manner, without delays, 
continuously moving from one state to the next. Differently 
form assessors, high locomotors may always engage in the 
most accessible activity, irrespective of its direction, i.e., 
they would ‘just do it’ (Kruglansky et al. 2000; Higgins et al. 
2003). It is generally assumed that assessment and locomo-
tion are independent psychological dimensions so that some 
individuals may be high in one or both dimensions or—in 
some situations—show a predominance of one orientation 
over the other (Kruglanski et al. 2000, 2012; Higgins 2003). 
In a similar way, it has been suggested that—possibly based 
on early life experiences—people can switch between a 
promotion and a prevention focus when dealing with novel 
states (Higgins 1998, 2000; Molden and Higgins 2008). A 
promotion attitude would be concerned with aspirations and 
accomplishments, creating a focus on achieving positive out-
comes. Eagerness (approach) strategies would fit this focus, 
by maximizing gain pursuit even at the risk of committing 
errors. On the other hand, prevention orientation would be 
more concerned with safety, responsibilities and obliga-
tions, creating a focus on controlling negative outcomes. 
This would be better achieved by vigilance (or avoidance) 
strategies (cf. Higgins 2000), which can protect against such 
outcomes even at the risk of forgoing possible gains. In other 
words, promotion or prevention attitudes would lead indi-
viduals towards the type of behaviour that better suits their 
priorities, ensuring against committing those errors they 
most strenuously wish to avoid (e.g., either missing oppor-
tunities or securing against losses).
Surprisingly, neuroscience has only just started to explore 
the putative bases for such an extensive behavioural vari-
ability, focusing mainly on the detrimental effects of a lack 
of motivation or willingness towards cognitive effort. Recent 
studies, however, indicate that at the neural level, variabil-
ity in connections between regions dealing with motiva-
tion to act and regions involved in action preparation could 
be responsible for individual differences in willingness to 
engage in effortful actions (behavioural apathy) (Bonnelle 
et al. 2016), thus providing a possible biological basis for 
the behavioural heterogeneity observed in healthy persons.
Current models of hemispheric specialization have 
described the left hemisphere as characterized by a ‘do 
something’ disposition (Braun 2007), as opposed to a more 
‘conservative’ attitude of the right hemisphere, which would 
be better suited to support freezing or avoidance behaviour 
(Vallortigara and Rogers 2005). The so-called Janus model 
of lateralized cognition (Dien 2008), for example, ascribes 
a proactive, future-oriented focus to the left hemisphere, 
which would be in line with its involvement in planning 
(e.g., Haaland et al. 2004) and hypothesis generation (e.g., 
Rausch 1977), as well as with the ‘interpreter’ role com-
monly ascribed to this hemisphere (Gazzaniga 1989, 1995; 
Metcalfe et al. 1995; Roser et al. 2005). It is likely that this 
functioning mode is integral to the system, as suggested by 
the fact that the left hemisphere of split-brain patients can-
not avoid generating causal hypotheses even when there is 
no pattern to read (Wolford et al. 2000) or when the result-
ing explanations are inaccurate or bizarre (e.g., Gazzaniga 
2000). On the other hand, it is generally agreed that right-
hemisphere cognitive modules process global information 
(e.g., Robertson and Lamb 1991a; Robertson et al. 1991b), 
integrating “ongoing strands of information into a sin-
gle unitary view of the past” (Dien 2008, p. 305). Such a 
reactive, past-oriented, focus would aptly serve the right-
hemisphere’s role in vigilance (Posner and Petersen 1990) 
and novelty detection (e.g., Stevens et al. 2005), as well as 
its involvement in inhibitory and braking responses (Aron 
et al.2014). Taken together, these findings seem to suggest 
that right-hemisphere’s modules associate with cautious and 
conservative reasoning (Marinsek et al. 2014), promoting 
a withdrawal-related behaviour that minimizes risk-taking 
(e.g., Gianotti et al. 2009), while cognitive modules in the 
left hemisphere would rather activate mentation and sup-
port proactive behaviour (cf. ‘freeze and recoup’ vs. ‘do 
something’, Braun 2007). In line with this hypothesis, it has 
been found that approach-motivated people, i.e., individuals 
showing a drive to achieve positive outcomes, present with a 
right-oriented bias, as would be predicted by a prevalent left-
hemisphere involvement (Harmon-Jones 2003; Nash et al. 
2010; Roskes et al. 2011). Similarly, a meta-analysis exam-
ining the neural bases of divergent thinking—a cognitive 
process that implies generation of multiple, original, creative 
responses to a problem (Beaty et al. 2014; Heilman 2016) 
while inhibiting unoriginal, interfering ideas that could pre-
vent ‘illumination’ to emerge (Heilman 2016)—has shown 
activations predominantly distributed to the left hemisphere 
(Dietrich and Kanso 2010; Gonen-Yaacovi et al. 2013), and 
coherently involving brain regions associated with reason-
ing and executive functions (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus and 
posterior parietal cortex).
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that 
in spite of the similarities that emerge between genders 
(see Hyde 2014, 2016 for a review), a significant variabil-
ity exists in the way men and women attain comparable 
results in a variety of tasks. For example, research on men-
tal rotation shows that men prefer a holistic strategy, while 
women rather adopt an analytic approach to reach the same 
goal (e.g., Jordan et al. 2002; Geiser et al. 2006; Heil and 
Jansen-Osmann 2008; Olsen et al. 2013). Similarly, in clas-
sic planning tasks—such as the Tower of London—success 
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is achieved by relying on visual imagery in males and on 
executive functions in females (Boghi et al. 2006). In emo-
tion recognition tasks, men are assumed to rely on percep-
tual analysis and reasoning, whereas women depend on 
emotional contagion and affective responsiveness (Derntl 
et al. 2010). Regardless of the domain, differences seem to 
exist also in the way men and women generally approach 
cognitive tasks. A recent study showed that when left in an 
unadorned room with the instruction to entertain themselves 
with their thoughts, a conspicuous part of male participants 
(67%)—but only a fraction of females (25%)—preferred to 
engage in the unpleasant activity of self-administering elec-
tric shocks rather than simply remaining alone with their 
thoughts (Wilson et al. 2014). This finding was ascribed 
to higher tendency in sensation seeking for men (Roberti 
2004), but it cannot be excluded that it simply reflects indi-
vidual variability in readiness to engage in thought-based 
activity or, alternatively, a progressive loss of motivation to 
perform the ‘thinking’ task. Indeed, boredom was found to 
elicit a similar behaviour in a group of participants required 
to watch for a full hour the repeated presentation of the same 
83 s video-clip (Nederkoorn et al. 2016).
Several studies indicate that females exhibit greater left-
hemisphere dominance than males (who would rather show 
stronger right-hemisphere reliance), possibly as a conse-
quence of the role that steroid hormones play in regulating 
functional cortical asymmetries (Wisniewski 1998; Cahill 
2006). Hence, the renowned ‘women left, men right’ distinc-
tion (Njemanze 2005; Cahill 2006) would predict some gen-
der differences in willingness towards cognitive engagement, 
with a female advantage for this trait. To test this hypothesis, 
we studied individual attitudes towards cognitive engage-
ment in men and women by means of a reward-independent 
reinforcement paradigm. This type of paradigm, which has 
been successfully applied to both animals (Skinner 1948) 
and humans (Ono 1987; Wagner and Morris 1987; Ninness 
and Ninness 1999; Vyse 1991), presents participants with 
a fictitious problem and automatically provides reinforce-
ment cues in a pseudo-random fashion. The neutral setup 
allows excluding possible confounds due to problem-solving 
styles, which are expected to emerge if the goal is actually 
attainable.
A group of healthy volunteers were shown a counter and 
a response pad containing four white and four-coloured but-
tons, and were asked to make the highest score possible. 
No instructions were given apart from mentioning that only 
the coloured buttons were functioning and that the system 
would automatically stop working after a quarter of an 
hour. Unbeknownst to participants, the counter automati-
cally added one point at pseudo-randomly distributed inter-
vals and data were actually recorded from all buttons. To 
explore proactive behaviour, we collected a series of descrip-
tive measures, such as activity/inactivity rate, whether and 
how the fictitious contingencies were exploited, and whether 
participants attempted uninstructed approaches to the task. 
In addition, to capture variability in participants’ approach 
to the task, we borrowed from general physics the con-
cept of entropy. Entropy is a dimensionless quantity that 
describes the tendency of a system to drift towards a state 
of disorder. As such, it provides a quantitative index of the 
randomness and complexity in the system. Higher entropy 
implies increased disorder and randomness, while lower 
entropy describes increased predictability and lower com-
plexity. In the neuroscience domain, this function has been 
previously applied to quantify the degree of irregularity 
in postural sway patterns (Manor et al. 2010), ageing and 
disease-related decline (Sokunbi et al. 2011), and neurody-
namics of consciousness states (Carhart-Harris et al. 2014). 
Here, entropy was used to capture the degree of complexity/
predictability of the pattern of activity produced by each 
participant during the task: the higher the entropy, the more 
diversified and changeable the pattern of interaction with the 
keyboard. The lower the entropy, the more stereotyped and 
fixed the strategy applied.
Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty healthy participants (15 females; mean age 
24 ± 2.8 years; education 16 ± 2.2 years) were recruited 
among students and personnel working in the Lyon hospi-
tal area. Sample size was established based on the previous 
studies applying this type of paradigm (Ono 1987; Wagner 
and Morris 1987; Ninness and Ninness 1999; Vyse 1991). 
Separate t tests were used to verify that participants in the 
male and female groups did not differ in terms of age (f: 
23.5 ± 3.1, m: 23.8 ± 2.6, t = − 0.315, p = 0.75) and educa-
tion (f: 15.8 ± 1.8, m: 15.3 ± 2.7, t = 0.546, p = 0.59). In 
each group about 2/3 of participants were students, the rest 
were mid-level employees. All were right handed except for 
one female, who was left-handed. To gain a brief insight in 
the participants’ psychological attitudes, after the experi-
ment they completed three scales exploring perceived level 
of anxiety (Zung Self Rating Anxiety Scale, Zung 1965), 
impulsiveness (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, Baylé et al. 
2000), and locus of control (Levenson Locus of Control 
Scale, Loas et al. 1994). Separate t tests were used to verify 
that no differences emerged between male and female par-
ticipants on these traits (Zung scale, f: 36 ± 7, m: 36 ± 4, 
t = 0.0003, p = 0.99; Barratt, f: 60 ± 7, m: 65 ± 4, t = − 1.470, 
p = 0.17; Levenson, Internal f: 29 ± 6, m: 29 ± 5, t = 0.172, 
p = 0.86; Chance f: 15 ± 6, m: 17 ± 4, t = − 0.561, p = 0.58; 
Powerful Others f: 15 ± 6, m: 18 ± 6, t = − 0.896, p = 0.38).
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All participants were naive as to the purpose of the exper-
iment and provided informed consent before performing the 
task, in agreement with the declaration of Helsinki and local 
ethical guidelines for behavioural non-invasive studies.
Procedure
Paradigm was derived from the one used to assess the effects 
of response-independent scheduling of reinforcement in 
animals (Skinner 1948) and humans (Ono 1987; Wagner 
and Morris 1987; Ninness and Ninness 1999; Vyse 1991). 
In a quiet room, participants were shown a counter set to 
zero and a response pad (Fig. 1a). Instructions were limited 
to indication of the goal (making a high score), time limit 
(a quarter of an hour), and the information that only the 
coloured buttons were active. They could use both hands 
to respond. Unbeknownst to participants, the counter auto-
matically added one point to the score at pseudo-randomly 
distributed intervals (30 s or 60 s) regardless of activity from 
the participant (Fig. 1b). In addition, after 10 min (i.e., 2/3 
of the allotted time, time of subtraction: TS), the counter 
removed one point from the obtained score, disrupting the 
additive routine. The point was re-assigned at the next coun-
ter movement and the additive routine re-established for the 
last 5 min of the task. In spite of what said to participants, 
activity on all buttons was recorded. Participants performed 
the task individually and were alone in the room during the 
experiment. One experimenter monitored their activity dur-
ing the task through a hidden window. Participants were 
informed of the disguised observation soon after the end of 
the experiment. When finished, participants were debriefed 
on their final score and asked how they had solved the task.
Data collection and analyses
Participants’ responses were collected throughout the entire 
session. For the purpose of analyses, we focused on three 60 s 
windows, hereafter labelled T1 (from attribution of point1 to 
Fig. 1  a Schematic representa-
tion of the setup. Participants 
sat facing a counter initially 
set to 00000. Their task was 
to increase the score and—to 
do it—they had a response 
pad (with 4 coloured and 4 
white buttons) and a quarter of 
an hour. They were told that 
only the coloured buttons had 
been activated. b Timeline of 
point attribution. Regardless 
of participants’ activity, the 
score increased automatically 
in 30 s–60 s steps. Analysed 
time windows were the follow-
ing. T1: from 1st to 2nd point 
(60 s); T8: halfway through the 
task (60 s); TS: interval after 
subtraction of one point (30 s); 
T16: last minute of the task 
(60 s)
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point2), T8 (halfway through the task), and T16 (last minute) 
(Fig. 1b). In addition, for measures that required a database 
spanning across longer durations (e.g., overall inactivity rate, 
see below), we either analysed the duration of the entire ses-
sion or divided the experiment in two parts of equal duration 
(8 min). Five basic behavioural measures were computed and 
analysed: activity rate, inactivity rate, response to point addi-
tion, response to point loss, and use of uninstructed buttons. 
In addition, we computed entropy to obtain a more compre-
hensive quantitative measure of variability in the participants’ 
pattern of response across the task. Details on each measure 
are listed below.
(1) Activity rate, i.e., the total number of button pressing 
across the entire task (and the corresponding proportion for 
each time window) provided the most general measure of 
engagement. (2) Inactivity rate, i.e., the amount of time (sec) 
participants spent being idle, quantified the overall duration of 
pauses. This was computed for entire duration of the experi-
mental session as the total time elapsed without participants 
producing any response between one point attribution and the 
next. For example, if in the entire session a participant did 
not press any button only between attribution of point 10 and 
11, her overall inactivity rate would be 30 s (see Fig. 1b). (3) 
Response to point addition, i.e., the number of times partici-
pants immediately re-used the button they had pressed right 
before the counter granted one point, describes some degree 
of action monitoring and provided a measure of the tendency 
to respond to apparent causation. It was separately computed 
for the 1st and 2nd half of the task, the maximum attainable 
score being 10 (i.e., the number of counter changes in each 
half of the task). (4) Reaction to point loss (TS in Fig. 1B), 
i.e., the percentage change in activity following the one point 
loss was used to quantify responses to the one occasion in 
which the counter worked backwards. This was computed by 
estimating the percentage difference in activity between the 
time window that followed point loss as compared to the time 
window preceding it. (5) Use of uninstructed buttons, i.e., the 
percentage of white buttons pressed by each participant in 
each representative time window was used to quantify likeli-
hood of departing from guidelines and experimenting novel 
approaches to achieve the goal.
In addition to these measures, we also computed (6) 
entropy, i.e., a measure of the uncertainty inherent to the dis-
tribution of a variable, which was used to quantify the degree 
of disorder in the pattern of button presses, thus providing an 
objective measure of how diversified and changeable the pat-
tern of interaction with the keyboard could be. Specifically, 
joint entropy (H) describes the joint distribution of a pair of 
discrete random variables x and y, according to the formula:
H(X, Y) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈I
p(x, y) log (p(x, y)),
where H relative to the T1–T8 (1st half of the task) and 
T8–T16 interval (2nd half of the task) was used to infer 
how patterns varied across time, offering a description of 
whether participants persevered in searching for a way to 
increase the score throughout the entire task or reverted to a 
wait-and-see strategy. Finally, to provide a more traditional 
description of participants’ interactions with the response 
board, we quantified the relative distribution of key presses 
during the task for the possible combinations of the four but-
tons, and grouped them according to the patterns that most 
consistently emerged.
For each measure, means and standard deviations (M, 
SD) were computed separately for the male and female 
participants. Due to partial loss of data from one male 
participant, current results refer to 29 volunteers. Differ-
ences between groups were assessed by means of Wilcoxon 
Matched Pairs test or Mann–Whitney test (based on findings 
from Shapiro–Wilk’s W tests). Chi-square test was used to 
compare frequency of a given behaviour in male and female 
participants. Cohen’s d (Cohen 1988) was used to measure 
the magnitude of gender differences, as recommended by 
the previous studies (Hyde 2014, 2016). Logistic regression 
was used to verify whether entropy affected likelihood that 
a given pattern of key presses belonged to a male or female 
participant. The binary dependent variable, i.e., gender, was 
coded so that 0 = female and 1 = male. The probability that 
the pattern belonged to a male or female participant was 
modelled as a function of the variable entropy (assumed 
to be a potential predictor of the participant’s belonging in 
either group). Alpha level for statistical significance was set 
at 0.05. Bonferroni correction was applied to multiple com-
parisons if needed. Data analysis and entropy calculation 
were performed in MATLAB environment.
Results
All participants started the task as soon as the experimenter 
left the room. Typically, they used the right, dominant, hand 
to initiate the task, first pressing either the upper right (48%), 
or the upper left button (31%) (lower right button 14%, lower 
left 7%). This was true also for the one left-handed partici-
pant. Observational data further indicate that all participants 
used alternatively the right and left hand in the first half 
of the task, but most reverted to using mainly the domi-
nant hand in the second half of the task. This behaviour was 
observed in both men and women. Means and standard devi-
ation for the six computed measures are reported in Table 1.
Activity rate
In the 16 min of the experiment, participants produced on 
average 1648 button presses (Table 1). When the sampling 
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windows are considered, activity rate was higher in the first 
(T1) compared to the last minute of the task (T16) for all 
participants (Z = 2.02, p < 0.04, r = 0.38). A drop in activity 
from the first to the middle time window (T8) was seen in 
men, although the difference just failed to reach significance 
(Z = 1.85, p = 0.06, r = 0.49). For the same time period, a 
slight, not significant (p = 0.34) activity increase emerged in 
women, who—at T8—were significantly more active than 
men (U = 52, p < 0.02, r = 0.60). In line with these findings, 
Cohen’s d for activity at T8 was 0.67, indicating a moderate 
to large gender difference. Conversely, in the first and last 
minute of the task, Cohen’s d was 0.52 and 0.04, respec-
tively, suggesting a moderate to negligible gender difference.
Inactivity rate
Inactivity rate within the entire task was longer in men com-
pared to women (U = 49.5, p < 0.03, r = 0.28) (Table 1). 
If the only female outlier (S23, inactivity rate = 450 s) is 
excluded from the analysis, Cohen’s d for inactivity rate is 
0.84, suggesting a large gender difference. In fact, 71% men 
(but only 53% of women) restrained from any activity at 
least once between one point addition and the next. Among 
participants that never took a break 64% were women [χ2(1, 
N = 29) = 10.75, p < 0.005). The first inactivity period 
occurred after 2 and 4.5 min in the male and female groups, 
respectively.
Response to point addition
When the counter added one point, all participants 
returned—at least once—on the button they had 
pressed right before the apparent gain. On average, this 
behaviour occurred on approx. one-third of counter 
changes (Table 1). In men, this behaviour was signifi-
cantly more common in the 2nd half of the task (Z = 2.19, 
p < 0.03, r = 0.59]; conversely, in women, no differ-
ence emerged between the 1st and 2nd parts of the task 
(p = 0.60).
Reaction to point loss
Approx. 40% of men and 20% of women were idle in the 
30 s preceding point loss; all of them resumed the task in 
the 30 s following point removal. The same was true for the 
three participants (2 men) for whom only 1–4 key presses 
were recorded prior to point loss. Among participants who 
had been active before point removal, 60% of men increased 
their activity rate, while half of the women actually reduced 
their activity, the other half either keeping it constant (25%) 
or increasing it (25%)[χ2(1, N = 20) = 14.07, p < 0.001] 
(Table 1).
Use of uninstructed buttons
Although none of the participants admitted to using the but-
tons described as “not active” by the instructions, 66% of 
them tried them at least once during the task. About one-
third of these participants (mostly females) did so within 
the very first 30 s. In women in particular use of these but-
tons stably amounted to approx. 6% of total activity (T1 6%, 
T8 7%, T16 6%). In contrast, it was limited to 1% in male 
participants (T1 0%, T8 1% T16 1%). For this behaviour, 
Cohen’s d indicates a moderate gender effect at T1 (0.52).
Table 1  Main measures collected during the task
Mean values (M) and standard deviations (SD) for all participants. Cohen’s d (Cohen 1988), which was used as a measure of the magnitude of 
gender differences, is reported in the rightmost column (see text for details)
All participants Women Men d
M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range
Activity rate (N button pressed) 1648 1043 (324–4499) 1804 1053 (742–4499) 1481 1044 (324–3854)
T1 113 72 (28–357) 116 78 (33–357) 109 67 (28–264) 0.52
T8 102 94 (0–339) 134 101 (4–339) 68 75 (0–225) 0.67
T16 79 84 (0–324) 85 83 (0–324) 73 88 (1–280) 0.04
Inactivity rate (duration in sec) 63 107 (0–540) 21 27 (0–90) 105 140 (0–540) 0.84
Resp. to point addition (prop.) 0.27 0.15 (0–0.7) 0.29 0.20 (0–0.7) 0.26 0.10 (0.1–0.5)
1st half 0.25 0.17 (0–0.7) 0.29 0.22 (0–0.7) 0.21 0.11 (0–0.4) 0.46
2nd half 0.33 0.21 (0–0.8) 0.32 0.26 (0–0.8) 0.34 0.15 (0.2–0.7) 0.07
Resp. to point loss (% increase) 11 62 (–46 to 147) 6 63 (–46 to 147) 20 66 (− 32 to 142) 0.34
Entropy
T1–T8 3.44 1.02 (2–5.37) 3.80 0.70 (2–5.37) 3.10 1.20 (0–4.07) 0.71
T8–T16 2.98 1.15 (0–3.92) 3.50 0.70 (2–4.54) 2.40 1.30 (0–3.93) 1.02
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Entropy
Joint entropy was significantly higher in women compared 
to men (Fig. 2; Table 1) particularly in the second half of 
the task (U = 51.5, p < 0.02, r = 0.43), accounting for a more 
diversified pattern even when a significant part of the time 
had elapsed. Cohen’s d relative to joint entropy was 1.02, 
testifying a strong gender difference in the pattern of activity 
produced in the second half of the task.
To support this observation, we used logistic regression 
to assess whether entropy scores affected likelihood that a 
given response pattern belonged to a man or a woman. The 
model correctly classified 86.6% of females and 57.1% of 
males (Max likelihood, final loss = 16.39, Chi-square = 7.40, 
p  < .0.006; odds ratio for the classification matrix = 8.66, 
unit change = 0.32, − 95%CL = 0.11, + 95%CL = 0.93).
Differences in entropy appeared to be unrelated to basic 
non-cognitive measures. No significant correlation emerged 
between entropy and traits such as anxiety (Zung Self Rat-
ing Anxiety Scale, r = 0.24, p = 0.37, n = 16), impulsiveness 
(Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, r = 0.44, p = 0.13, n = 13), and 
locus of control (Levenson Locus of Control Scale, Internal 
subscale, r = − 0.24, p = 0.28; Chance subscale r = − 0.01, 
p = .0.67; Powerful Others subscales, r = − 0.21, p = 0.35, 
n = 22).
Descriptive analysis of patterns of button presses
A descriptive survey on the relative use of the four 
instructed buttons further showed that men and women 
made an entirely different use of the keyboard. In Fig. 3, 
the relative distribution of key presses for the possi-
ble combinations of the four buttons is shown, grouped 
according to the most consistent patterns.
In detail, Fig. 3a shows the patterns that accounted for 
about 3/4 of the possible combinations of the four but-
tons. Their relative distribution is detailed in panel B: 
overall the most common patterns were sequential clock-
wise or counter-clockwise movements over the keyboard 
(35%) and sequential presses of the same key (27%), while 
other patterns were less frequent. Panel C further details 
this distribution separately for male and female partici-
pants in the two halves of the task. As can be seen, in the 
first half of the task, circular patterns were significantly 
more common in women than in men (U = 66, p < 0.04, 
r = 0.32), who rather opted for sequential presses of the 
same key (although the latter difference was not signifi-
cant, p > 0.05).
Debriefing session
At the end of the experiment, participants were inter-
viewed on the score obtained, and the way that they 
thought points had been attributed. More than a half of 
participants (71% of men, 53% of women) were positive 
that some method or rule existed to increment the score, 
and most admitted to have been unable to disclose it. Eight 
participants creatively elaborated on the alleged method 
to increase the score (see Table 2). The remaining partici-
pants correctly realized that the counter worked automati-
cally and reported it. Interestingly, although the latter par-
ticipants claimed that point attribution did not depend on 
their own activity, their behaviour did not significantly dif-
fer from responses of participants that believed they could 
influence counter changes. In fact, by the end of the task, 
although both activity rate (aware, N = 11: 36 ± 49; una-
ware, N = 18: 106 ± 91) and entropy (aware: 2.92 ± 0.71; 
unaware: 3.01 ± 1.37) were lower in the group that became 
aware of the automaticity, no significant difference 
emerged between the two groups (activity rate, U = 57, 
p = 0.06, r = 0.35; entropy, U = 74.5, p = 0.27, r = 0.20). 
While the absence of difference could depend on the small 
sample size, it is also possible that it reflects the fact that 
participants in the ‘aware’ group continued to work on the 
keyboard either as a mean to entertain themselves (as most 
of them reported), or for reasons, they failed to overtly 
report, such as complying with task assignment, expecta-
tions about task rewards, beliefs about possible changes in 
the counter functioning, and so on. The finding that most 
participants, independently from their reported awareness, 
increased their activity after point loss could support this 
interpretation.
Fig. 2  Joint entropy relative to time windows T8–T16. Entropy 
describes the degree of disorder in the pattern of activity produced 
by participants. T8–T16 joint entropy informs on activity during the 
second half of the task (last 8 min). In the plot, the limits of each 
box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles, their relative distance 
the interquartile ranges. The red line is the sample median. Whiskers 
indicate adjacent values, i.e., the lowest and highest values. Entropy 
was significantly lower in men compared to women
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Fig. 3  Response patterns 
grouped according to task 
period and gender. a Charac-
teristically shaped sequences 
of four consecutive key presses 
that were observed in the group 
of participants while engaged in 
the task. Patterns are presented 
according to their relative 
occurrence (i.e., upper panel 
referring to more frequently 
observed). b Percentages of 
patterns occurrence within 
all participants for the whole 
task; ‘Same Key’ refers to four 
consecutive presses of the same 
button, other labels as in a. c 
Percentages of patterns distribu-
tion split according to task 
period and gender: a significant 
female/male difference was 
found for the more frequent 
pattern in the first half of the 
task. F = females, M = males, 
*p < 0.05
Table 2  Debriefing session
At the end of the task, participants were asked (1) the score they had obtained and (2) how they thought points were added. As the counter 
worked automatically, the final score was 19 for all participants, which they dutifully reported. With respect to question (2), 71% of men and 
53% of women were positive that some method or rule existed to increment the score, and most admitted to have been unable to disclose it. Eight 
participants creatively elaborated on the alleged method to increase the score: transcription of their responses is reported below
ID Response to the question: could you speculate on how the points were added?
P7 f You had to press two or more buttons together to get a point
P12 f You need to avoid doing the same thing twice, else you loose points
P17 f The counter works on its own but if you find the right code you get a bonus. I realized it by pt 4 or 5
P6 m It was an automatic system and you earned points by either not pressing the buttons or doing the same thing continuously
P11 m The trick was not pressing the buttons. If you press, you loose points
P16 m There was an automatic system but you still needed to keep pressing the buttons to earn points
P20 m It works on its own. I noticed it between pt 5 and 10, but you still need to press the buttons else you loose points
P21 m There was a shifting rule, which changed every time I disclosed it. Plus, you always needed to press some button else it 
penalized you
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Discussion
As nicely pointed out by Orne in 60 s, the assumption that 
the participant of an experiment is a passive responder 
to stimuli is difficult to justify (Orne 1962). Whenever 
people first engage in a novel task, a variety of factors 
(e.g., expectations, cognitive style, and personality traits) 
play a role in shaping the way that the goal is attained. 
While the detrimental effects of apathy are well known 
(cf. Vansteenkiste et al. 2004; Stanton and Carson 2015), 
until recently, little attention has been paid to the “posi-
tive” sides of effort in task engagement (Hill and Aita 
2018). To our knowledge this issue, which is well known 
to social and experimental psychology, has been mainly 
explored qualitatively, via interviews and questionnaires. 
In this view, the present preliminary study provides a 
novel, quantitative measure of individual involvement in 
a cognitive task, and identifies a gender-modulated pat-
tern that could be interpreted in terms of hemispheric 
asymmetries. In line with the observation that activity in 
the left hemisphere is associated with inferential causal-
ity operations (cf. Gazzaniga 1989, 1995; Metcalfe et al. 
1995; Roser et al. 2005), divergent thinking (Dietrich and 
Kanso 2010; Gonen-Yaacovi et al. 2013), and a gener-
ally proactive disposition (Braun 2007; Dien 2008; Tops 
et al. 2017), we found individual differences in eagerness 
to engage in cognitive tasks that could reflect a preferred 
left- or right-hemisphere functioning mode.
The reactive, wait-and-see attitude showed by male 
participants, especially when it became progressively 
clear that proactive behaviour was not paying, was the 
most ergonomically successful strategy, since partici-
pants’ activity did not affect point attribution. This find-
ing is reminiscent of observations showing that men 
typically outperform women at the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT). Guessing tasks akin to the IGT are usually solved 
either by maximizing or by a frequency matching strat-
egy (Estes 1961; Hinson and Staddon 1983): the former 
leads to constantly choosing the alternative that max-
imises probability of reward, while the latter implies 
searching for the frequency pattern that allows predict-
ing the next item. Men are assumed to acquire informa-
tion more globally compared to women, in line with a 
more right-hemisphere-oriented functioning (Andreano 
and Cahill 2009; Cahill 2006). It has been proposed that 
IGT performance becomes progressively more dependent 
upon right hemispheric functioning (van den Bos et al. 
2013), which could justify the male advantage at the 
gambling tasks. In the present experiment, men’s right-
oriented functioning could similarly have supported the 
longer pauses of inactivity recorded in the second part 
of the task as well as the lower entropy, which signals 
a shift towards an ordered—possibly repetitive—pattern 
of activity. Conversely, a more protracted reliance on a 
left-hemisphere-oriented, analytic mode of functioning, 
may have led female participants to explore all possible 
combinations, thus accounting for their higher activity 
rate and higher entropy. This increased engagement would 
be in line with models that describe the left hemisphere 
as characterized by a ‘do something’ disposition (Braun 
2007), as opposed to a more ‘conservative’ attitude of the 
right hemisphere, which would be better suited to support 
freezing or avoidance behaviour (Vallortigara and Rogers 
2005). The present findings also fit nicely within a recent 
conceptual framework proposed by Tops and co-workers 
(Tops et al. 2017) that describes behavioural control in 
terms of predictive (i.e., based on internal prediction) and 
reactive (i.e., guided by external stimuli) systems. The 
Predictive and Reactive Control Systems model theory 
(PARCS) accounts for individual differences in apprais-
ing and coping with challenges based on the activity of 
a distributed brain network in which laterality is coupled 
with a dorsal–ventral functional axis (Tops et al. 2017). 
This functional network would respond to environmental 
variability by providing individuals with systems enabling 
control within unpredictable, unstable and novel situa-
tions or stable, predictable, and familiar contexts. Reac-
tive control would serve behaviours driven by stimuli and 
environmental cues, ensuring that responses are always 
sufficient through increased and undifferentiated activa-
tion. Conversely, predictive control would be internally 
organized according to model-based predictions and 
expectancies derived from prior experiences, allowing 
slowly learning by updating existing models, thanks to 
predictability of a stable environment. At the neural level, 
reactive and proactive coping would preferentially engage 
the right vs. the left hemisphere, and would be further 
modulated by lateralized dorsal and ventral corticolimbic 
systems, respectively. In this view, one could speculate 
that the protracted engagement of a right-hemisphere, 
reactive-oriented control system justifies the progressive 
demotivation observed in male participants in the present 
experiment, which would reflect the fact that physiological 
costs of undifferentiated activation cannot be indefinitely 
sustained.
Use of uninstructed buttons also differed between male 
and female participants, being more marked in the latter. 
The present paradigm does not allow inferring the reasons 
for this behaviour, which could imply either increased crea-
tivity or a different attitude towards rules. Actually, previ-
ous studies suggest that both traits could be involved. A 
study on variation in divergent thinking and creativity in 
women has shown that these abilities are enhanced during 
the pre-ovulatory phase, i.e., when oestrogen concentration 
is maximal. Conversely, tendency for stereotyped behaviour 
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is increased during the menses when this hormone’s level 
is minimal (Krug et al. 1994). Although we did not check 
for this parameter in female participants, this observation 
could point to the possibility that increased creativity played 
a role on the choice to additionally explore inactive but-
tons. More consistently, it has been reported that—when 
faced with moral dilemmas or judgments—women and men 
adopt different evaluation schemes (Gilligan 1977). While 
females show a strong care-based orientation, males rather 
work on justice-based parameters, which capitalize on rule-
abidingness and maintenance of order (Harenski et al. 2008). 
This difference could account for a stronger ‘expertise’ of 
women in interpersonal relationships and of men in inter-
group relations (Koscik et al. 2010). Here, a differential 
approach towards rules and obligations might have played 
a role in the different choice of departing from instructions 
and experimenting on the possible functioning of the addi-
tional buttons.
The current study addresses a relatively unexplored topic 
and should be considered as preliminary, because it presents 
two major limitations. First, the sample size is comparatively 
small for a gender differences’ study, which suggests that 
conclusions should be taken with care: further studies should 
be run to confirm the present observations on larger groups 
of participants. Second, in interpreting the present findings, 
it should be recalled that we only explored a limited set of 
the variables that could play a role in variability in willing-
ness to engage in cognitive activity. An alternative account 
for the differential behaviour of participants in the present 
experiment could in fact be found within the framework of 
self-regulation theories (Higgins 1998, 2000, 2003; Krug-
lanski et al. 2000, 2012; Molden and Higgins 2008). In this 
view, it could be assumed that male and female participants 
oscillated between a more pronounced assessment/preven-
tion focus and a more pronounced locomotion/promotion, 
respectively. The longer pauses and reduced use of unin-
structed buttons in males could be viewed as an indication 
of their attempt to do ‘the right thing’, preventing possible 
negative outcomes. The higher entropy recorded in the pat-
tern of activity of female participants could instead reflect 
keenness to accomplish the goal, ensuring that no opportu-
nities for it are missed, even if this could mean taking the 
risk to commit errors. In keeping with these theories, men 
would appear to have favored a vigilance/avoidance strat-
egy, while women would have rather chosen an approach/
eagerness strategy to solve the current task. Further studies 
directly exploring possible relations with these personality 
traits could provide a more definite description.
Moreover, it could also be that recreational habits, such as 
experience in video gaming activity and/or competitiveness 
in these games, may have affected participants’ behaviour at 
a task like the one selected here. In fact, even if this was con-
structed as a response-independent reinforcement paradigm, 
participants were actually given a goal to pursue (achieve a 
high score) and this could have differently impacted on indi-
viduals used vs. not used to play computer games. However, 
according to a recent review on the topic (Reid 2012), video-
game players are mostly men, and male players are reported 
to play longer hours than females. Accordingly, one could 
have expected increased motivation linked to this type of 
habit to eventually boost activity mainly in the male group, 
which does not seem to be reflected in the present results.
It could also be noted that besides possibly promoting 
competitiveness—the task used here also implied alloca-
tion of mental processes that participants could have rather 
chosen to direct towards other activities than its solution. 
The so-called opportunity cost model (Kurzban et al. 2013) 
suggests that given the impossibility of running all tasks at 
once, the brain must prioritize among possible computations 
by assigning costs and benefits to the candidate options. 
Within this framework, the costs of allocating mental pro-
cesses to a task would equal the value of the next-best use 
of those mental processes. Rewards, expected utility and 
benefits that would be foregone by engaging in one task 
would thus provide a measure of the mental effort involved, 
eventually (though not necessarily) leading to ceasing one 
activity in favor of another. Although here, we did not collect 
measures of subjectively perceived mental effort, it could be 
speculated that participants’ behaviour partly reflected the 
opportunity costs of continuing vs. stopping pursuing the 
indicated goal. Namely, rather than assuming a lateraliza-
tion hypothesis (i.e., a conservative right-hemisphere dispo-
sition), it could be that participants’ who gave up searching 
for a pattern in the second half of the task may have in fact 
deemed the cognitive effort involved as overriding potential 
benefits, especially since the experimenter was not in the 
room (thus making social disapproval less of an issue) (e.g., 
Kurzban et al. 2013).
In any case, whatever the reading one takes of the pre-
sent findings, they indicate for female participants a certain 
degree of proactivity, persistence and self-starting attitude, 
which—although compatible with a more left-hemisphere-
oriented functioning mode—may be viewed as somewhat 
unexpected with respect to what proposed by social ste-
reotypes. Behaviourally, these traits have been typically 
associated with the concept of personal initiative, i.e., the 
readiness to initiate actions and assess things independently. 
When compared to findings from other domains, which com-
monly describe more personal initiative in men (Koellinger 
et al. 2013; De Pater et al. 2009; Jackson et al. 2001; Was-
serman and Richmond-Abbott 2005; Fallows 2005), our 
results may in fact indicate a possible incongruity. While 
the dimension of the present sample could account for this 
finding, it is also possible that the reason for the discrepancy 
lies in the fact that the previous studies explored initiative 
mostly from a social perspective, namely, within strongly 
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biased contexts. Work-related gender stereotypes indicate 
that traits such as entrepreneurship and business-like atti-
tudes are more positively associated with masculine than 
with feminine traits (Ahl 2006). According to the Stereo-
type Threat Theory (Steele 1992, 1997), stereotypes strongly 
affect the behaviour of the individuals towards whom preju-
dices are directed. Recent studies have shown that proactive 
people are deeply affected by stereotypes—being extremely 
sensitive to the impressions others have of them (Dutton 
et al. 1997; Crant 2000; Gupta and Bhawe 2007). In a similar 
way, it is possible that social stereotypes impact on women’s 
behaviour, smothering the proactive attitude that emerges 
in the neutral task applied here. Indeed, both boys and girls 
acquire gender stereotypes from an early age, as a longitu-
dinal study on Disney Princess engagements has recently 
demonstrated (Coyne et al. 2016). We can thus speculate 
that in contexts subjected to gender stereotypes, reports of 
women’s low personal initiative may in fact represent the 
epiphenomenon of some form of stereotype threat.
Although different problems require different mental 
operations, all solutions benefit from the drive motivating 
whoever embarks in a task. In this view, variability in atti-
tudes towards cognitive engagement is likely to affect opti-
mal performance as well as consistency across time, intro-
ducing a relatively undetermined source of variability. On 
this respect, the present findings suggest a note of caution 
as to the use of gender-unbalanced samples in experimental 
tasks. With few exceptions, studies in cognitive neuroscience 
are conducted on a mixed population of male and female 
participants. Data from the two groups are pooled to obtain 
an image of how the “average brain” works. However, men 
and women are known to rely on different strategies when 
solving cognitive and affective tasks (Jordan et al. 2002; 
Geiser et al. 2006; Heil and Jansen-Osmann 2008; Olsen 
et al. 2013; Boghi et al. 2006; Derntl et al. 2010; Stoet 
2016), indicating that averaging may inevitably cancel out 
information and that gender-unbalanced samples produce 
biased results (cf. Bell et al. 2006). The novel finding here 
is that even in a fictitious cognitive task—men and women 
showed different attitudes towards cognitive engagement. 
Women emerged as enthusiastic participants, likely to attend 
to the task throughout the allotted time, but less eager to 
believe a cover story and keen on checking for themselves 
about efficacy of instructions to optimize performance. 
Conversely, men could be relied upon complying with rules 
but—as time went by—seemed to become progressively less 
involved with the task. These idiosyncrasies should be con-
sidered when recruiting volunteers for studies in cognitive 
neuroscience.
In conclusion, results of this preliminary study highlight 
a gender modulation in the strategy adopted as well as in the 
cognitive approach to a novel task, the neutral setup directly 
allowing for individual dispositions to emerge. Clustering 
of performances according to gender fits well with previous 
research focussing on creative thinking demonstrating that 
men and women differently use their cognitive potential in 
contexts in which finding ideas for a solution is involved 
(Abraham et al. 2014).
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